Senior Judge Sim Lake of the Southern District of Texas denied Porter Hedges LLP's motion to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) in Magçmâ Technology LLC v. Phillips 66, No. 4:20-cv-02444 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 16, 2026). Magçmâ sued Phillips 66, Phillips 66 Company, and WRB Refining L.P. on July 13, 2020, alleging infringement of four patents for refining marine fuel oil (Op. 1-2).
From a partial contingency fee to a fee dispute
In December 2021, Magçmâ and Porter Hedges converted the matter to a partial contingency fee, under which the firm would be paid a percentage of its invoiced hourly fees and receive a percentage of the net sum recovered. The opinion does not state the percentages. Porter Hedges represented Magçmâ through discovery, pretrial motions, and a June and July 2023 jury trial that ended in a verdict for Phillips 66. Magçmâ appealed, represented by Winstead P.C. and a lawyer who had moved there from Porter Hedges, and the appeal resulted in a Federal Circuit order granting Magçmâ a new trial (Op. 3-4).
Porter Hedges withdrew as counsel at Magçmâ's request in April 2026. On July 24, 2026, after Magçmâ notified the court that the parties had reached a settlement during mediation, the court dismissed the case without prejudice to a motion to reinstate within 60 days on adequate proof that the settlement could not be consummated. On August 26, 2026, Porter Hedges moved to intervene to assert breach of contract and declaratory judgment claims for its contingent fee and, in the alternative, quantum meruit. The same day, Magçmâ and the defendants filed a joint motion to dismiss with prejudice (Op. 4-5).
Jurisdiction existed, but the court declined to use it
Magçmâ did not dispute that Porter Hedges met the four requirements of Rule 24(a)(2) and argued only jurisdiction (Op. 7). The court held that because its original jurisdiction over the patent claims rested on 28 U.S.C. 1331 and 1338(a), and because Porter Hedges met Rule 24(a)(2)'s requirements, 28 U.S.C. 1367(a) provided supplemental jurisdiction over the firm's claims in intervention. It rejected Magçmâ's argument that the fee claims were not part of the same case or controversy, reasoning that the last sentence of section 1367(a) expressly extends supplemental jurisdiction to the intervention of additional parties and that the Fifth Circuit has long permitted district courts to adjudicate fee claims by discharged contingent-fee counsel through intervention in the underlying case (Op. 11-14).
The court then declined to exercise that jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1367(c), finding at least two and arguably all four of that subsection's factors present. It found that the fee claims rest on state law, that the patent claims have all been resolved, and that the fee claims would require reopened discovery, new pretrial motions, and a new trial on fees, unlike a typical post-judgment fee motion about reasonable hours and rates (Op. 14-17). The court denied the motion to intervene and denied as moot the firm's motion to strike Magçmâ's sur-reply (Op. 17).